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communities through links with agribusiness 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The trend of market-oriented reforms, following multilateral trade liberalisation and 
especially structural adjustment programmes in developing countries, have led to the 
increased integration of world markets (Reardon and Barrett, 2000). This has meant 
that farmers in the developing world are now, more than ever, linked to consumers 
and corporations of the rich nations. Although most of the changes in agricultural and 
food markets are taking place in developed countries, they have far reaching 
implications for agricultural development efforts in developing countries.  
 
The changes in food and agricultural markets (the so-called industrialisation of 
agriculture) have influenced the need for higher levels of managed co-ordination. This 
has resulted in the introduction of different forms of vertical integration and alliances, 
which have become a dominant feature of agricultural supply chains. Allied to these 
changes is a worldwide increase in consumer demand for differentiated agricultural 
products that are relatively labour i ntensive (Rhodes, 1993; Royer, 1995; Pasour, 
1998).  
 
These consumer demands, combined with the reality that food safety issues are more 
likely to be a concern in the case of fresh food products, have led to major concerns 
for developing countries. Fresh f ood products, which include fresh meat, seafood, 
vegetables and fruits, account for half of the value of total food and agricultural 
exports from developing countries (Unneveher, 2000). The need to control for high 
perishability and safe handling requires  specialised production, packing techniques 
and refrigerated transport, all of which require large capital investments and also 
involves investment in research, development, and marketing, which small and 
medium enterprises cannot easily afford.  
   5
However,  it is also true that it is often only the well endowed and skilled that has the 
ability to be part of these co-ordinated marketing chains and alliances. There is, 
therefore, a danger that the requirements, quality standards and food safety rules of 
the consumers and corporations (supermarkets) in the developed countries can act as 
effective barriers to participation in the high value chains by small exporters and, to 
some extent, small producers. It is only a small number of farmers in developing 
countries that have the ability and luxury to be part of these lucrative markets and for 
them the reward is substantial.  
 
Recent studies of the managerial economics of industrialised agriculture have 
revealed crucial new insights of the economic rationale for higher levels of managed 
co-ordination as a choice of governance structure. In conjunction with this, the history 
of vertical co-ordination projects in developing countries has provided many lessons 
and a reference framework against which future development can be evaluated. All of 
these could pioneer a new approach to improve our understanding of market access 
problems facing farmers in developing countries. This new approach, based on the 
new institutional economic theory, argues, amongst other things, that we now have 
economic actors engaging in transactions rather than a large number of atomistic 
firms constituting a ‘market’.  
 
There are serious concerns about the ability of small farms and also small 
agribusiness firms to survive in the medium term under these changing circumstances. 
The process of industrialisation has created opportunities for smallholders in 
developing countries to produce horticultural commodities under contract according 
to certain specifics (Kandiwa, 1999), but has the danger that small farmers will be 
marginalised and excluded from high value markets (Reardon and Barret, 2000). The 
challenge is thus to prevent this from happening and to find ways to link small 
growers in developing countries to these high value markets. It is argued that the 
major route for continued survival of small-scale farms, would, only be through a 
reliance on external rather than internal economies of scale through 
networking/clustering and other forms of alliances. This could be amongst small firms 
or through e stablishing links between small firms/growers and larger enterprises who 
have already overcome the major barriers to market entry. These links are usually   6
formalized through some form of contract similar to contract farming schemes 
implemented in the developing world.  
 
It is in this context that this study provides a first understanding of the nature of the 
linkages between farmers and agribusinesses in South Africa. The focus is especially 
on farmers from previously disadvantage groups of the South African population who 
were denied commercial farming opportunities under the apartheid regime. These 
farmers face a double challenge to enter a very competitive domestic market as well 
as having to deal with the challenges posed by the process of agricultural 
industrialisation. The only way empowerment of these farmers could take place is to 
ensure some form of linkage with agribusiness (including traders, market agents and 
the traditional range of value adding enterprises in the food chain), which will secure 
market access for them on a sustainable basis. After discussing the characteristics of 
the South African agricultural and agribusiness sector the paper presents a number of 
case studies to illustrate the nature of the linkages farmers from disadvantaged 
communities have with the commercial agricultural market and various agribusinesses 
per se.  
 
2. Agribusiness and its place and role in the South African economy 
 
2.1Overview of policy changes in the agricultural and agro-industry sector 
 
Until early in 1998 the marketing of most agricultural products in South Africa was 
extensively regulated by statute. One of the main characteristics of the control that 
was exercised was isolation from world market forces. Most products were regulated 
under the 22 marketing schemes introduced from 1931 and especially from the time 
of the 1937 Marketing Act, although some products, including sugar, wine and 
ostriches, were regulated by those industry’s own institutions under separate 
legislation. 
 
Beginning two decades ago, the i ndustry faced increasing pressures for deregulation, 
a process that was accomplished in two phases over this period. The major change in 
the first phase was the extensive deregulation of state agricultural marketing schemes 
within the framework of the Marketing Act of 1968. The origins of this change can be   7
found in the shift in monetary policy in the late 1970s and fiscal strategies in the 
1980s, which undermined the complex structure of protection, price support and 
cross-subsidies on which the system of  agricultural support was founded. Yet 
isolation from the world market, accompanied by the increased isolation of the 
country in social, cultural, political and intellectual spheres during the 1980s, meant 
that the deregulation steps that did take place were aimed at the domestic market 
(Vink and Kassier 1991, Francis and Williams, 1991; Vink, 1993; Kirsten and van 
Zyl, 1996; Vink, 2000). Further, the market in Africa was not considered to hold any 
real potential, partly because it was regarded as too small, but mostly because of the 
anti-apartheid measures that were in place. Foreign trade still largely consisted of 
managing imports and exports in order to manipulate domestic prices (e.g. maize, 
wheat), or of monopoly export schemes (e.g. for fruit). The first real steps in opening 
the agricultural sector to world market influences came with the Marrakech 
Agreement of the GATT in 1993, when all direct controls over agricultural imports 
were replaced by tariffs.  
 
The government of national unity, elected in 1 994, ushered in new policies across the 
entire range of state activities. In agriculture, some tended to follow the direction of 
changes already under way (Hall and Williams, 2000). Major direct policy changes 
had to wait until after the National Party, and its Minister of Agriculture, Kraai van 
Niekerk, withdrew from the government in 1996. New policy initiatives included the 
land reform programme; laws protecting agricultural workers and labour tenants 
against eviction and extending their rights; liberalization of international trade and 
agricultural marketing; the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act, No 47 of 1996; a 
new rural development policy; and institutional restructuring in the public sector. The 
purpose of the reforms was to correct the injustices of past policy, principally through 
land reform, to direct agriculture towards a less capital -intensive growth path, and to 
enhance its international competitiveness. South African agriculture has now taken its 
place as a fully integrated member of the global trade environment, and its trade 
patterns have shifted considerably over the past decade.  
 
The South African Agricultural and Food Sector 
 
Until the agricultural potential of the SADC region is exploited, South Africa will   8
produce more, and hence  be in a better position to trade in international markets, than 
its regional neighbours. The structure of output in South African agriculture is shown 
in Table 1 below. Given that most of the country is unsuited to cultivation, it is no 
surprise that the l argest component of production comes from livestock, with field 
crop production marginally larger than horticulture. As expected, production per 
hectare is far higher in the horticultural sector, followed by field crop production.  
 
Field crop sector has b een most affected by the process of deregulation. Field crop 
production has declined from almost half of total output in the three year period 
centred around 1978/79 to less than a third in the three-year period centred on 1999. 
In this time animal production increased its share somewhat, while horticultural 
production increased its share by 10 percentage points. 
 
Table 1: The value of commercial agricultural production in South Africa (1999)
1 






Output (tons)  Production 
(R per ha) 
Physical output  
(t per ha) 
Maize  5,484,468    3,868,000  10,613,000  1417.91  2.74 
Tobacco  437,720    16,000  29,700  27357.50  1.86 
Cotton  144,905    51,000  167,692  2841.27  3.29 
Soya beans  196,179    94,000  152,600  2087.01  1.62 
Field crops  13,666,600.00  11,992  9,528,309    1434.32  - 
Horticulture  11,714,500.00  8,039  3,898,486    3004.88  - 
Cattle slaughtered  3,983,215      495,000    - 
Animal production  18,938,700.00  31,442  63,384,734    298.79  - 
Total  44,319,800.00  60,938  82,209,571    539.11   
 
                                                   
1 Note: During mid 2002 the South African Rand traded at roughly R10 against the US dollar   9
The data in Table 2 show the trade performance of South African agriculture over the 
past two decades. The first observation is that agricultural exports have grown rapidly, 
especially from 1990, but that agricultural imports have grown even  faster. The 
second observation is that, despite this rapid growth, South Africa’s total exports and 
imports have been growing even faster.  
Table 2: Trends in South Africa’s agricultural exports, 1980 - 1999 
  1980  1990  2000 
Exports 
Total SA exports (Rm) 
Total agricultural exports (Rm) 














Total SA imports (Rm) 
Agricultural imports (Rm) 













Exports + imports/Total production (%)  34.5  34.5  57.5 
 
Sales in the South African manufacturing sector grew by some 2.5% per annum in 
real terms in the period 1996-2001, a rate close to the overall real rate of growth of the 
economy. By contrast, sales of the food and beverages industries grew by about half 
that rate, making it one of the worst performers in this sector. Recent sales growth in 
this subsector has been third highest among the components of the manufacturing 
sector. Production in the food and beverages group accounted for about 18.5% of total 
manufacturing output for the country in 1996, while employment was 15.9% of total 
manufacturing sector employment and the wage bill 13.5% of total manufacturing 
sector wages. A more detailed breakdown of the subsector is provided in Table 3, 
while the degree of concentration in 1996 is reflected in Table 4, the most recent 
available data. 
 
Table 3: The South African food and beverage sector 
  Sales (Rm)  Employment  Exports (R’000)  Imports (R’000) 
1994  78079  225527  6205634  5524284 
1995  80131  219155  6752412  6291720 
1996  83886  221426  8286938  6625716 
1997  83607  209686  8247898  7471358 
1998  81896  201594  9061613  6989492 
1999  81759  203211  9122024  6468007 
2000  79757  187882  10270184  6556806 
2001  84689  184187  12225957  6742894 
 
The South African agro-food complex, which consists of primary production plus the 
input and agro-processing sectors, accounts for around 14% of the GDP. In 2000 the 
agro food complex exported about R16 billion worth of primary and processed food 
products, or nearly 10% of South Africa’s total exports. Almost all the productive and  10
social activities of rural towns and service centres are dependent on primary 
agriculture and related activities. This includes increasingly popular and economically 
significant agro-tourism and game farming activities. Taking all of this into account it 
is true that more than half of the provinces and about 40% of the country’s total 
population are primarily dependent on agriculture and its related industries.   11
Table 4: An overview of the food and beverage (agribusiness sector) in South Africa, 1996 
 
 
Major group and subgroup 
No of 
firms 
Relative contribution of -  Paid 
employees 
Salaries 


















No   
Rbn 
 
Major group - meat, fish, fruit, 
vegetables, oils and fats 
480  0,1957  0,3678  70 383  1 962  13 142   10 366  2 776   0.339   0,0188 
Slaughtering, dressing, packaging livestock  149  0,4688  0,6358  13 731  324 705  2 610   2 184  0.425   0.034  0,0661 
Prepared and preserved meat  119  0,5591  0,7114  13 461  269 766  1 939  1 501  0.438  0.050  0,0989 
Canned, preserved and processed fish  46  0,5778  0,7924  11 862  272 275  1 333   0.789   0.544   0.144  0,1346 
Canned and processed fruit and vegetables  157  0,3498  0,5497  25 321  552 940  3 685  2 831   0.854   0.067  0,0482 
Vegetables and animal oils and fats  16  0,6520  0,9779  6 008  272 303  3 575  3 061  0.514  0.045  0,1319 
Major group - Dairy products  113  0,6843  0,8005  21 933  852 474  5 980  4 646  1 334   0.184  0,1598 
Processing of fresh milk  46  0,7079  0,8350  9 002  286 451  1 960  1 491  0.469  0.048  0,2430 
Butter and cheese  17  0,8199  0,9743  3 032  155 379  1 502  1 160  0.315  0.034  0,1923 
Ice cream and other edible ice  45  0,6007  0,7628  2 144  68 910  0.42 8  0.345   0.083  0.040  0,1293 
Milk powder & other edible milk products  13  0,8700  0,9986  7 755  341 734  2 090  1 650  0.441  0.062  0,2742 
Major group - Grain mill products,   283  0,3604  0,5636  25 161  0.957   12 708  10 648   2 060  0.363   0,0457 
Flour  209  0,4258  0,6481  16 228  0.592  7 643  6 350   1 293  0.187  0,0648 
Breakfast foods, starches & starch products  8  0,9544  -  2 126  0.103   0.967   0.688   0.279  0.145  0,3005 
Prepared animal feeds  72  0,3727  0,6076  6 807  0.262  4 098   3 610  0.488   0.032  0,0522 
Major group - Other food products  821  0,2613  0,5331  74 116  2 571  15 414   11 086   4 328  0.583  0,0323 
Bakery products  522  0,4526  0,6262  31 228  0.881   4 224  3 003  1 221  0.199  0,0609 
Sugar, golden syrup and castor sugar  7  0,9856  -  15 304  0.442   3 565   2 583  0.982   0.121  0,3098 
Cocoa, chocolates and sugar confectionery  72  0,7287  0,8237  10 148  0.475  2 194  1 522   0.671   0.095  0,1676 
Coffee, coffee substitutes and tea  15  0,8038  0,9580  3 379  0.121  1 399  1 073  0.325  0.061  0,2060 
Nut foods  31  0,5129  0,7598  1 190  0.021  0.123   0.091  0.033  2 518  0,0920 
Other not elsewhere classified  182  0,3719  0,5012  12 867  0.630   3 909   2 814  1 096  0.104   0,0471 
Major group - beverages  163  0,4556  0,7455  36 028  1 840  14 639   10 132   4 507  0.627  0,0760 
Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits  97  0,6926  0,7812  12 566  0.458   4 552   3 548  1 005  0.253   0,1386 
Beer and other malt liquors and malt  23  0,9195  0,9756  11 497  0.738  5 944  3 863  2 081  0.228  0,3777 
Soft drinks; mineral waters  43  0,7355  0,9142  11 965  0.644   4 143   2 721   1 422  0.146  0,1876 
Source: Vink, Tregurtha and Kirsten (2002) 
An index of between 0.10 and 0.18 represents a moderately concentrated market.  12
 
 
Table 5 shows that the South African food and agricultural industry as a whole is 
marginally competitive when measured by the Revealed Trade Advantage, a measure 
based on the share of the country’s net trade in a specific commodity relative to its 
total international trade. The RTA for 1998 was 0.33, although it has improved from 
1992 onwards, a period that coincides with the deregulation of agricultural marketing.  
 
Table 5: Comparative advantage in the South African agro-food industry  
  RTA 1998  RTA 1997  Trend 
1980 – 98 
Trend 
1992 - 98 
National competitiveness  0.33  0.17  =  + 
Note: ‘+’ Positive trend; ‘-‘ negative trend; ‘=’ constant trend 
 
Table 6: Comparative advantage of selected agro-food chains in South Africa  
Chain  Product  RTA 1998  RTA 
1997 
Trends 
1980 - 98 
Trends 
1995 - 98 
Cotton chain  Cotton seed 
Oil of cotton seed 
Cake of cotton seed 
Cotton lint 







































































Beef chain  Cattle 
Beef and veal 













Maize chain  Maize 









Soybean chain  Soybeans 
Oil of Soya beans 


















Sugar chain  Sugar (Centrifugal, Raw) 
Sugar refined 
Sugar confectionery 

















Source: Esterhuizen (2001) 
 
3. Linking poor farmers with agribusiness in South Africa 
Due to its historical legacy South African agriculture is characterised by extreme 
dualism, which is not reflected in the overview presented in Section 2 above. There 
are around 50 000 large commercial farmers who are predominantly, but not  13
exclusively, drawn from the white population. Commercial farms employ about 1 
million workers, which is 11% of total formal sector employment in the country. 
Many of these workers live on commercial farms and their children receive education 
in farm schools. These commercial farms compare very well with the large farm 
enterprises in the US where packing and processing is sometimes done on the farm. 
Many farmers have recently moved to contractual arrangements with larger 
processing and retailing companies to secure markets and less volatile prices. On the 
other hand retailers and agribusiness nowadays prefer such arrangements in order to 
ensure reliable supplies and less fluctuation in prices (as we discussed in the 
introduction). This trend has been very apparent following the process of abolishing 
the controlled marketing arrangements in the country in the post 1994 period. The 
linkages that have emerged range from formal delivery contracts to production under 
strict instructions to informal marketing arrangements.  
 
Apart from the large-scale commercial farmers, there are also 240 000 small farmers 
(mainly black) that provide a livelihood to more than 1 million of their family 
members and occasional employment to another 500 000 people. These farmers 
supply local and r egional markets where large numbers of informal traders make a 
living. Furthermore, an estimated 3 million households who are primary located in the 
communal areas of the former homelands, produce largely to meet part of their 
family’s total needs.  
 
With  the change in the political dispensation there has been a need to commercialise 
the agricultural activities of these households. Some earlier efforts by parastatal 
development corporations and some agribusinesses are commendable but the 
challenge of black  empowerment in agriculture is so huge that much more needs to be 
done. Improving on-farm productivity for increased sales could be one way of 
stimulating commercial activity and thereby linking them to markets. However our 
experience with development efforts over the years has clearly shown that this 
approach is not sufficient because access to markets (and finance) seems to be more 
important for economic success. Poor developed links with markets (and thus with 
agribusiness per definition) have reduced incentives in agriculture to such an extent 
that farmers in many cases have abandoned farming activities. This has been a major 
problem not only amongst farmers of perishable commodities such as dairy, fruits and  14
vegetables but also amongst grains, oilseeds a nd beef. The lack of market access is 
often attributed to poor infrastructure and communication. But sometimes it is just 
poor quality or quite often lack of trust that creates the perception that these farmers’ 
products do not comply with the basic minimum requirements in order for it to be 
sold. 
 
It therefor becomes quite important for agribusiness in South Africa to develop 
stronger links with disadvantaged farming communities to ensure that true economic 
empowerment materialises. It is argued that some  special actions from the business 
community are needed to tackle this major challenge in South African agriculture. 
Maybe the lessons emerging from this paper can make a contribution in this regard. 
 
Over the years agribusiness have invested in some initiatives to ensure a much 
stronger engagement of farmers in disadvantaged communities in the production of 
especially industrial crops such as sugar, tea, cotton and timber. Lately there have also 
been a number of initiatives by agribusinesses and some facilitators to provide more 
and better market opportunities for disadvantaged farmers in the production of 
tomatoes, other vegetables, wine, fruit, grains, wool and livestock. These are all new 
initiatives and as a result we will not be able to document it here. For that reason we 
present only the following case studies to illustrate the nature of the links of small-
scale farmers with agribusiness: 
 
•  Small-scale sugar farmers linked to a sugar mill 
•  A group of small-scale timber growers linked to a major timber company 
•  Small-scale out-growers for a large tea company 
 
In addition we also briefly discuss a very novel approach or concept to link small-
scale grain and oil seed producers to the market. These producers are poor, do not 
have collateral and are therefore e xcluded from producing grains and oilseeds on a 
commercial scale. By linking the credit market, input market, output market and the 
futures market this is now made possible.  
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We approach the analysis of the case studies from a strict New Institutional 
Economics perspective. This approach allows us to unpack the nature of the 
arrangement in a much more structured framework and also enables us to debate the 
appropriateness of the current arrangement given the characteristics of the product, 
transactions and the partners.   
 
3.1 Creating Opportunities for small-scale sugar farming: The case of the 
Transvaal Sugar Company. 
 
3.1.1.  Introduction 
 
The South African sugar industry is regulated by the Sugar Act (1978), which grants 
statutory powers of self-government to this sector of the agricultural economy. The 
affairs of the sugar industry are controlled by the South African Sugar Association 
(SASA) who administers the production and supply of sugar cane to the millers and 
also the production, marketing and distribution of sugar. The principal sugar growing 
areas of South Africa primarily include Kwazulu-Natal, Mpumulanga and the Eastern 
Cape where the climatic conditions are more favourable for the growing of sugarcane. 
The South African sugar industry produces an average of 2.5 million tons of sugar in 
2000/1 of which 50% was exported to markets in Africa, the Middle East, North 
America and Asia. These exports contributed R 1.9 billion to the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings. The sugarcane industry directly employs approximately 85 000 
people and provides employment for an additional 265 000 in industries that are 
linked to this sector of the economy. The number of growers and area under sugar 
cane are illustrated in Table 7. South African cane growers produce  over 23 million 
tons of sugar cane annually that are processed in 15 different milling area. Large 
growers (3%) are responsible for over 70 % of sugarcane produced whilst small 
growers (97%) account for less than 30%.  
Table 7: Cane Area and Number of Sugar Growers 
                         
  1999/2000  2000/1 
Growers  Numbers     %  Area (ha)   %  Numbers    %  Area (ha)    % 
Small Scale  51 439        96.7  82 831     19.6  50 561       96.6  83 482         19.6 
Large Scale  1744            3.3  338 806    80.4  1799            3.4  343 116       80.4 
Total  53 183      100.0  421 637   100.0  52 360     100.0   426 598     100.0 
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Transvaal Sugar Limited (TSB), which employs around 4000 people, was founded in 
1965 and operates in the province of Mpumalanga with offices  in Johannesburg and 
Durban. TSB is a 100% owned subsidiary of Hunt Leuchars and Hepburn (HL & H) 
which, in turn, forms part of the Rembrandt Group of companies. The company has 
the capacity to produce 350 000 metric tons of sugar annually from its two factories 
and sugar production has increased from 109 500 metric tons in 1975/76 to the current 
level of approximately 300 000 metric tons in 2000/1. Assets employed have 
increased from R 80.5 million in 1986 to R 586 million in 1995 with an estimated 
current replacement value of R 2.3 billion.    
 
The sugarcane supply-processing operation of the Transvaal Sugar Company consists 
of the factory processing operation and a range of growers. The factory processing 
operation consists of two sugar mills. The first mill is located at Malelane and the 
second mill is located south of Komatipoort both in Mpumalanga. The growers 
include the company estates and a range of contracted large-medium and small-scale 
suppliers/growers. 
 
The differences between the types of growers can largely be categorised on the basis 
of the differential farm size and the level of capital investment (See Table 8). In the 
case of the company estates, the milling company farm large tracts of land.  This 
operation is categorised by a modern capital-intensive mono-cropped sugarcane 
production system with high levels of management input and control. The second 
category of grower, namely, contracted medium-large growers, are also characterised 
by a modern capital-intensive mono-cropped sugar cane production system with high 
levels of management inputs. These farmers are contracted to the Transvaal Sugar 
Company by way of a long-term specification contract and supply in excess of 64 % 
of the total volume of sugarcane delivered to the two mills. Most of t hese farmers 
operate farms that are in excess of fifty hectares and in many cases, sugar cane is one 
of the farm enterprises together with sub-tropical fruit and vegetables. These farmers 
are largely autonomous and the growing and delivery of sugarcane is  self managed 
with ad hoc inputs from the agricultural division and the factory cane supply division 
who co-ordinates the timing of the harvesting and delivery operations. The third 
category of grower, namely the contracted small-scale growers, includes in  excess of 
1000 small-scale farmers belonging to thirty-two different supplier groups. The  17
average farm size of these growers is 6.8 hectares with the smallest farm recorded as 
around 3.7 hectares and the largest 30 hectares.  
 
Table 8: A profile of the different growers 
   Komati Mill    Malelane Mill    Total   





32  45 
(1) 







58  14140 
(70) 







10  5144 
(750) 







100  19741 
(821) 





3.1.2  The Supplier Contract 
The contractual arrangement between out-growers and the Transvaal Sugar Company 
(TSB) is controlled by a cane delivery agreement. A ll growers must adhere to the 
conditions and obligations that are specified in a comprehensive specification contract 
that binds the respective parties over long periods of time. The price paid to out-
growers is determined by the specifications of the South African Sugar Association 
who determine the grower-miller split from the proceeds of sugar sales. Clauses nine 
to twelve cover transfers of areas, rights and amendments to the contract whilst clause 
thirteen stipulates the terms of the contract as a result of a  force majeure. Clauses 
fourteen to seventeen outline the conditions of termination, default, jurisdiction and 
arbitration respectively. Finally, clauses eighteen to twenty outline the procedure of 
notification, cession and miscellaneous issues.  
 
3.1.3  Transaction Characteristics  
The transaction characteristics of the cane supply operations are illustrated in Table 9. 
The processing of large volumes of a perishable commodity like sugarcane requires 
the co-ordination of the activities of the growers with the optimum use of high fixed 
cost processing facilities that are unique to the sugar industry. The volume of supply, 
the nature of the suppliers and the industry specific nature of the processing plant and 
equipment, in turn, influences the dynamics of the firm's transactions. In order to 
identify and evaluate the transaction characteristics of the supply chain a number of 
assumptions were made. The annual number of sugarcane deliveries to the mill was 
employed to determine the transaction characteristic of frequency whilst the value and 
co-ordination requirements of company fixed assets was used as a basis to determine  18
asset specificity. The transaction characteristic of uncertainty has been evaluated on 
the basis of analysing the conditions of supply.  
 
Table 9: The Grower-Processor Transaction Characteristics for 2000/1 
Transaction Characteristic  Total/Quantity 
Hectares  42 268 
1. Frequency   
Tonnage Crushed  3 800 000 
Number of Deliveries  136 000 
Administration  
Tons per transaction  
High 
246 
2. Asset Specificity   
Co-ordination Level  High 
Value of Plant  R 2.3 bill 
Agricultural assets  > R 500 million  
3. Supply Uncertainty  Medium-high 
  Processing  High 
  Downstream  High 
 
Transaction Frequency 
The TSB milling operation processes around 19 000 tons of sugarcane per day or an 
annual volume of around 3.6 million tons of sugarcane that are transported by way of 
136 000 deliveries. The continuous nature of the processing operation, combined with 
the large volumes of sugarcane processed and the perishable nature of the raw 
commodity, do not allow the processor to stockpile sugarcane. On the basis of this 
evidence, this study has concluded that the transaction characteristic of frequency 
should be classified as high. 
 
Asset Specificity 
The mill group currently employs over R500 million of fixed assets at gross book 
value. These assets have a current value in excess of R2 billion and are highly specific 
with low opportunity cost outside the sugar industry. The assets, moreover, are 
relatively immovable and are also site specific as they have been centralised in 
relation to the company estates and out-grower suppliers. Conversely, the assets of the 
contracted growers consist largely of irrigation and general farming equipment that 
can be applied relatively more easily outside the sugar industry. The factory assets 
also demonstrate high levels of asset specificity as a result of the need to maintain 
constant use of capacity. TSB management is required to manage and co-ordinate the 
harvesting and delivery o f sugarcane from the company estates, over 140 medium-
large scale commercial farmers and, in excess of, 1000 small-scale growers. On the 
basis of the value of sugar specific plant and equipment, combined with the high level  19
of co-ordination required to synchronise the sugarcane supply-processing operation, it 
is quite evident that high levels of asset specificity exist in the supply chain. The 
milling company has therefore some vested interest in ensuring good relationships 
with the growers due to the fact that many (especially the larger growers) can easily 
switch to higher value enterprises such as mangoes and citrus if the incentives in 
sugar are not appropriate.   
 
Uncertainty of Supply 
The uncertainty of sugarcane supply is a function of the reliability of the growers 
combined with the uncertainties of agronomic and climatic variables. Because the 
supply of sugarcane from the company estates is internalised in the company 
structure, low levels of uncertainty attach to this category of supplier. The reliability 
of supply from contracted growers, however, is often a function of alternate 
opportunities and sugar prices that are struck in volatile markets. The level of 
uncertainty attached to this category of grower is, therefore, higher than the company 
estates. The high fixed cost nature of the processing operation, moreover, also 
promotes uncertainty because of impact this has on the volatility of cash flows (Drury, 
1996, Horngren, 1999). On the basis of this evidence a low to moderate level of 
uncertainty is assumed. 
 
 
3.1.4  The governance structure for the sugar supply chain 
The process of matching a set of transaction characteristics with the optimal 
governance structure (i.e. how the supply chain and the links with growers are 
managed) is a central tenet of transaction cost theory. Organisations that have 
transaction characteristics that reflect high levels of asset specificity, combined with 
the need to carefully co-ordinate a complex input-output function, require higher 
levels of managed co-ordination  than the open market mechanisms (Williamson, 
1981; 1996; 2000; Petersen & Wysocki, 1997; 1998).  
Table 10: Governance structure: Grower -processor links 
Theoretical optimum/ 
Actual Structure 












Level of managed co-ordination  0%  Low  Intermediate  Int./high  High 
Governance Form    Contract 
Growers 
    TSB Company 
Estates 
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In the case of sugar production the transaction characteristics suggest an  optimum 
structure somewhere between specification contracting (using outgrowers with 
contracts) and full vertical co-ordination (full ownership of production and control) on 
the vertical co-ordination continuum reflected in Table 10. The actual organisation 
structure of sugarcane supply in the case of TSB, however, displays an aggregated 
structure that is closer to specification contracting than full integration because 82% is 
acquired by means of grower contracts.  
 
The Transaction Cost of Supply 
The objective of this section is to demonstrate that the transaction cost of small-scale 
growers exceeds that of medium and large-scale growers in the TSB cane supply 
operations. Table 11 outlines the type of transaction, as well as, an observation as to 
whether the company incurs any transaction costs with small farmers (SF) and/or 
Medium-Large Growers (LF). The TSB departments involved in the various 
transactions include the Small Commercial Farmer Department (SCG), the 
Agricultural Division (AG), the Cane Supply  Division (CS) and the Administration 
Department (ADM). 
 
The differential cost of the smallholder supply operation, in general, is illustrated by 
the annual budget of R3.2 million of the small farm department of the company. The 
TSB grower transactions include set-up transactions, cultivation transactions, 
harvesting and delivery transactions and administration transactions. Firstly, 
smallholders incur higher levels of start-up cost. Start-up transaction cost is incurred 
by all contracted growers with respect to the initiation of the contract. However, only 
small-scale farmer projects receive high levels of company assistance with respect to 
their interaction with local authorities, assistance with financing, training, land 
preparation and the installation and maintenance of irrigation equipment. Medium and 
large growers, largely, self establish their legality and ability to be engaged as 
contracted suppliers. Secondly, smallholders incur higher levels of transaction cost in 
all phases of the growing operation. Small-scale growers, again, require higher levels 
of company inputs from the agricultural (AG) and small farm commercial (SCG) 
departments with respect to the planting, weeding, fertilising, irrigation and ripening 
of cane. Small-scale growers, moreover, require higher levels of company inputs to 
guide and co-ordinate harvesting and delivery transactions. Conversely, larger farmers  21
interact on an occasional basis with TSB with respect to growing technologies. 
Although larger farmers also receive regular v isits from the TSB cane supply (CS) 
department, transaction cost for the company when dealing with the smaller growers 
is much higher. 
 
Finally, smallholders also incur higher levels of administration cost per ton delivered. 
A sample of large, medium and s mall-scale suppliers accounting transactions is 
illustrated in Table 12 for the period 2000/1. The administration of suppliers’ 
accounts is managed by way of a creditors system that generates a weekly payment, in 
cheque form, for the weekly tons delivered  to the mill. The creditors system also 
adjusts this payment if the supplier has drawn items from stores. Large suppliers, for 
instance, only generated 76 accounting transactions against a delivery volume of 
47840.55 tons for the 2000/01 season. Conversely, medium size suppliers delivered 
10 623.69 tons against 138 accounting transactions and small-scale suppliers 978.0 
tons against 26 accounting transactions. The transaction cost, stated in terms of tons 
per transaction, indicates that large growers deliver over 613 tons before an 
accounting transaction is generated whilst the medium suppliers deliver 76 tons per 
accounting transaction and small-scale growers 37.6 tons per transaction. Smaller 
growers, in this regard, generate differential levels of administration cost, in the form 
of accounting transactions, because they make more use of inputs from the company 
stores and, TSB, in certain instances, sets up and administers their savings accounts. 
This case study concludes that small-scale farmer transactions exceed those of larger 
suppliers, principally, because of the disproportionate level of company input in the 
start-up, growing  and administration phase of the cane supply operations. The 
incremental cost of dealing with different suppliers has also not been identified in the 
TSB records, which simply record these activities as overhead expenditure.  
 
Table 11: Costs for grower-processor transactions 
Transaction  Small-scale Growers  Large Growers  
TSB Start Up Cost  Volume  Department  Volume  Department 
   Contract Authorisation    High Vol.  SCG, ADM,  Medium volume  ADM 
   Assistance with authorities  High Vol.  SCG  No  No 
   Assistance with financing  High Vol.  SCG  No  No 
   Training Costs  High Vol.  SCG  No  No 
   Land Preparation Inputs  High Vol.  SCG  No  No 
   Irrigation inputs  High Vol.  SCG  No  No 
Cultivation         
   Planting  High Vol.  AG, SCG  No, Occ.  AG 
   Weeding  High Vol.  AG, SCG  No, Occ.  AG 
   Fertiliser Application  High Vol.  AG, SCG  No, Occ.  AG 
   Irrigation  High Vol.  AG, SCG  No, Occ.  AG 
   Ripening  High Vol.  AG, SCG  No, Occ  AG  22
Harvesting and Delivery         
   Harvesting  High Vol.  CS,  SCG  Low Vol.  CS 
   Extraction  High Vol.  CS,  SCG  Low Vol.  CS 
   Transport  High Vol.  CS,  SCG  Low Vol.  CS 
Cane Receiving  High Vol.  CS,  SCG  High Vol.  CS 
Administration    Very High  ADM  High  ADM 
 
 
Table 12: Volume of Accounting Transactions for 2000/1 
Supplier  Annual Tonnage  Accounting Transactions  Tons per Transaction 
Small  978.0  26  37.6 
Medium  10 623.69  139  76.4 
Large  47 840.55  76  613.3 
Total  59 442.24  241  246.7 
 
3.1.5  Grower Performance 
The grower performance, analysed between 1998 and 2001, indicates that small-
holder production efficiency matched that of the company estates in this period. The 
cost structure of TSB and the four sets of selected farmers, although c omparable from 
a total cost perspective, is significantly different in terms of operating and overhead 
cost. TSB displays a total overhead cost of R27 per ton whilst small-scale farm 
overhead costs have been estimated at R13.30 per metric ton. The small-scale growers 
appeared to contract more efficiently for a range of field and transport services than 
the company estates. Conversely TSB displays total operating costs of R86 per ton 
compared to small-scale grower costs of between R96 and R100. The company 
estates appear to have lower cultivating costs than the small-scale farmers indicating, 
somewhat paradoxically, that the estate productivity exceeds that of the family farms. 
This could be partially explained by the fact that the production of sugarcane is  not 
particularly labour intensive and that small-farmers may need to incur incremental 
cost for the use of mechanised inputs.  
 
Although we have analysed only the nature of the linkages here we should in closing 
also refer to the tremendous impact the small-scale grower programme of TSB had in 
the Nkomazi valley. Since the mill at Komatipoort was erected and the irrigation 
infrastructure established the physical and socio-economic landscape transformed 
within 2 seasons. The link of smallholders with the Sugar Company has improved 
livelihoods and alleviated poverty in many households in the community. The 
multiplier effects are also visible as more small enterprises got established. Thus a 
large benefit for the community has materialised out of small-grower a gribusiness 
linkage.  23
 
3.1.6  Summary and Conclusion 
The case study is an example of a successful smallholder contracting arrangement in 
the sugar industry. The results illustrated that the transaction characteristics of the 
cane supply-processing operation  influenced the level of managed co-ordination 
required, that small-holders incur higher levels of transaction cost and that they are 
able to compete, in terms of production efficiency, with larger contracted growers. 
The usefulness of these results can be  debated from a number of perspectives. Firstly, 
the use of transaction cost theory can contribute to a more informed process of 
selecting the right level of managed co-ordination for a given set of contractual 
conditions. Secondly, the case study clearly d emonstrated that differential small-scale 
farmer transaction cost could be broken down into cost elements. This can be useful 
in a number of ways. Incremental cost, once identified, can be charged back to the 
grower, form the basis of an agribusiness approach to the state for assistance or, 
lastly, provide the motivation to organise farmer inputs by way of a farmers 
association. These findings can be used as a basis to convince agribusiness that small-
scale operators can operate as viable business partners  and at the same time create an 
economic externality to the benefit of the whole of society.  
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3.2   Small-Scale Growers in the Timber Industry: Sappi’s “Project Grow” 
3.2.1  Introduction 
The South African forestry industry is an important player in the South African 
economy. This industry consists of two primary segments, namely, the growing of 
timber, which falls into the agricultural sector and the processing of timber, which 
falls into the manufacturing sector. The timber industry contributed a total of two 
percent of the total national gross domestic product in 2000/1. This contribution, over 
a twenty two-year period, has grown from 1.4 % in 1979/80 to its current level. The 
growing of timber, currently, contributes towards around 8 % percent of the national 
agricultural gross domestic product and the manufacture of pulp and paper products 
accounts for 9 % percent of the national manufacturing gross national product. This 
industry, moreover, makes a significant contribution to foreign trade and forestry 
products generated an annual net trade surplus of R 3.3 billion, or 8% of South 
African exports, in 2000/1. The industry has demonstrated a consistent annual growth 
of 8% over the last ten years and is one of the most internationalised industries in the 
South African economy. 
 
The South African forestry sector is a major employer of labour in South Africa. In 
2000/1 the industry employed 135 000 people who were either engaged in the primary 
production of timber or the processing of wood. This sector employs 5.7 % o f the 
total working population and includes the support of over two million dependants, 
many of whom live in rural areas. The estimated linkages effect generated by the 
industry would suggest an average multiplier of four resulting in a total employment 
potential of 500 000 people. The industry, moreover, is a major contributor towards 
the development of rural infrastructure and provides R 15 million per annum to the 
provision of housing and R 40 million per annum to the provision of health care. 
Other contributions to rural infrastructure include R15 million per annum towards the 
provision of schooling and bursaries and R10 million per annum towards the 
maintenance of provincial rural roads. 
 
The South African forestry industry, with a capital base of R25 b illion and an annual 
turnover of R12 billion, is a major supporter of the small-scale grower sector. The  25
industry has promoted the development of 15 000 emerging timber growers, in 
addition to, the promotion and support of forestry contractors and entrepreneur 
development programs. There are two principal types of commercial woodlot 
afforestation that embrace the small-scale farm sector. The first type is co-ordinated 
and sponsored by agribusiness and include examples like Sappi’s Project Grow, 
Mondi’s Khulanathi Project and initiatives set up by the South African Wattle 
Growers Association. The second type of small-scale grower operations is typified by 
ad hoc, uncoordinated individual plantings where no records exist and no 
authorisation has been received  from the relevant authorities. A summary of small-
scale timber production, illustrated in Table 13, reveals that 50 % of these growers are 
located in Zululand, 29 % in the Natal Midlands and 11 % in Southern Natal. Small-
scale growers have, therefore, developed predominantly in Kwazulu-Natal with a 
small percentage in the Eastern Cape. The incidence of forestry as a farming practice 
appears to be influenced by land tenure systems where in Kwazulu-Natal woodlots are 
individually owned whereas in the Eastern  Cape, land is owned on a communal tenure 
basis. At present some 24 205 hectares have been planted in managed small-scale 
grower schemes. The estimated total area planted, however is 43 455 hectares 
suggesting that 44% of the total area under small-scale farm afforestation is 
unauthorised and that 35% of farmers are operating without permission. 
 
Table 13: A Summary of Existing Small Grower Schemes authorised and 
managed by SAPPI 
Area planted in hectares by 
small growers 
No. of Growers   Location 
Authorised  Total  Authorised  Total 
Average Size 
Zululand  16 125 (50%)  32 250  6 155 (50%)  12 310  2.6 ha 
Natal Midlands  5 258 (71.4%)  7 361  2 944 (82.2%)  3 580   2.5 ha 
Southern Natal  2 555 (71.4%)  3 577  2 504 (70%)  3 577  1.0 ha 
Eastern Cape  267  267  45  45  5.9 ha 
Total  24 205  43 455  12 284  18 876  2.3 ha 
 
Some estimates have been made of the potential to expand the small farm sector and 
project that this sector can grow at an annual area of 17 630 hectares between 2001-
2005 that would result in a total increase of 93 100 hectares involving 10 197 new 
applicants. The principal areas of new afforestation are projected to be the Zululand 
area where the industry would expand by 27 225 hectares and the Eastern Cape at an 
estimated additional 62 000 hectares. These schemes  represent an investment of more  26
than R30 million, which is expected to generate some R 60 million when clear felling 
takes place.  
 
3.2.2  The Sappi-Saiccor Timber Supply Operation 
The Sappi-Saiccor timber supply-processing operation includes a processor, n amely, 
Sappi-Saiccor, a company in the Sappi Forest Products Group, and a range of 
company and contracted timber growers in Kwazulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, the Eastern 
Cape and the Highveld. The company produces dissolving pulp, a product that is 
made entirely  from hardwoods, namely, eucalyptus and wattle. In 2001 a portion of 
the production process was subcontracted in order to reduce the level of fixed cost and 
induce capacity flexibility.  
 
The Growers 
The entire timber supply operation is co-ordinated by the Sappi Forest Division and 
Sappi-Saiccor. Sappi Forest Division controls the activities of all the growers 
including the company plantations and a range of small-scale to large contracted 
growers. The first category of grower, namely, Sappi Forest, owns and manages 500 
000 hectares of plantations in Southern Africa that primarily grow eucalyptus and 
softwoods.  
 
The second category of grower includes medium to large scale contracted farmers. 
These growers are typically medium to large size family farms with an area under 
timber in excess of fifty hectares. These farmers are generally involved in a number of 
agricultural enterprises, which typically include timber, sugarcane, tea and fruit. Their 
timber plantations, thus, constitute only a part of the farming operation. This category 
of grower has been registered as a contracted supplier with the Sappi Forest division 
and the conditions of supply are dictated by a long-term specification contract. These 
growers are largely autonomous with respect to the growing of timber but the felling 
and delivery operations are controlled and co-ordinated by Sappi Forest Division who 
controls the supply of all timber to the Sappi-Saiccor mill. Sappi Forest personnel, 
however, can be consulted by the grower on an ad hoc basis. The timber operations of 
these farmers are less capital intensive than the company plantations with respect to 
plant, vehicles and equipment and in addition the farmers also subcontracts a majority 
of the felling-delivery operations.   27
 
The third category of grower includes managed small-scale farmers incorporated in 
Sappi's Project Grow program. This category of grower, occupy on average 0.6 
hectares each, is mostly located within a 100 kilometre radius of the company mill. 
Project Grow is a tree farming  scheme that has the objective of converting rural 
subsistence farmers into emerging commercial operations. This project was launched 
in 1983 by Sappi Forests, the Gencor Development Fund and the Kwazulu 
Department of Agriculture and Forestry with a view to developing viable small scale 
timber operations in rural Kwazulu-Natal. Since 1989, Sappi Forest division has 
contracted out the management of this project to a rural development organisation 
called Lima, which is a non government organisation registered  under Section 21. 
This organisation receives an annual fee from Sappi Forest division, to administer the 
Project Grow initiative with two management staff, two administration staff, six 
extension officers and eight field assistants.  
 
The Sappi Project Grow arrangement provides small farmers with financial 
assistance, seedlings, technical advice and a guaranteed market. Sappi Forest, via the 
management company Lima, provides an interest free loan of up to a maximum of R2 
700, calculated on a per hectare basis, for farmers to establish trees where all contracts 
have the approval of the local tribal authority. Thereafter, advances are paid out to the 
farmer for completed certified work over the growing period of the trees to ensure that 
operations are funded o ver the growing cycle. The contracted farmers are thus paid to 
do the land preparation, planting, weeding, coppicing maintenance and the 
management of firebreaks. Lima extension officers visit the growers frequently after 
the trees have been established to provide further assistance with weed control and the 
preparation of fire breaks. Sappi Forest, if requested by the growers and Lima, may 
also assist during negotiations with harvesting and transport contractors. At the time 
of harvesting Sappi Forest buys the timber from the farmers at a market related price 
less the advances paid out during the growing period. Additional benefits from 
growing timber include fencing, building material and firewood which is obtained as 
a result of coppicing when the trees are between one and a half years and three years 
old.  
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Sappi Forest Division has invested in excess of R10 million in Project Grow in terms 
of loans and an additional R5.2 million for seedlings. A summary of the growth of 
this project (Table 14) indicates  that the number of growers has increased from 101 to 
7 100 in the period 1989 to 2001. A total area of 4 223.8 hectares is currently being 
managed under this programme.  
 
Table 14: Project Grow Expansion 
 
Year  Growers  Area Planted  Area under Coppice  Total Area  GPS Positions marked 
1989  101  66.5    66.5  15 
1990  344  218.1    218.1  35 
1991  273  133.2    133.2  33 
1992  354  143.1    143.1  59 
1993  243  132.9    132.9  6 
1994  234  134.2    134.2  12 
1995  549  212.0    212.0  5 
1996  778  409.7    409.7  10 
1997  656  484.5    484.5  10 
1998  862  489.0  114.0  603.0  246 
1999  764  422.0  116.3  538.3  249 
2000  1085  400.5  172.7  573.2  335 
2001  857  574.9    574.9  714 
Total    3820.7  403.1  4223.8   
 
Timber deliveries in excess of 1 500 tons of timber per month were achieved for 2001 
generating some  R2.6 million for the season. The estimate turnover for 2002 has been 
set at R3.5 million. It estimated that an additional 1 120 people are employed by 
contractors who assist the growers with the planning and harvesting of their plots. The 
project contributes towards the upliftment of women in this area as some 80% of the 
growers registered with the project are women. The project generates considerable 
revenue for local communities with an estimate of 50% of turnover retained within 
the community as a result of payments to local contractors, 42 % retained by the 
grower and 8% refunded to SAPPI as loan repayment.  
 
3.2.3  The Supply Contract 
All contracted suppliers are required to enter into a timber purchasing agreement with 
the Sappi Forests division. The purchasing agreement specifies the exact location of 
the grower as well as the commencement and duration of the relationship. The 
agreement indicates the total tonnage to be delivered to the mill during the period of 
the contract and also stipulates the annual tonnage. The contract specifies the price 
that the company will pay for the tree species to be delivered or alternatively that the 
parties shall agree to an annual price. The supplier must adhere to quality  29
specifications as determined by the company mill. The supplier is required to obtain 
the necessary permits, license or statutory authority from the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry, the National-Provincial Environmental Authority and the 
Department of Agriculture. The conditions of delivery, r isk, ownership and payment 
are outlined in the contract with the risk only passing to the mill once the specified 
timber has passed over the company weigh-bridge. The date and mode of payment for 
a timber delivery is also specified. The company undertakes  to supply seedlings of a 
specific species on condition that the supplier gives proper notification and that 
transport costs are to be borne by the supplier. The company also undertakes to 
provide free technical advice during the growing cycle of the timber, however, the 
supplier must provide reasonable notification to the company and access to the 
growing site. A clause is inserted to cover both parties from  “force majeure” and 
outlines the terms and conditions of the suspension or waiving of contractual 
liabilities. The enforcement of the contract is stipulated by way of written notice to 
the defaulting party and the supplier may not sub-contract or cede any of the terms 
and conditions of the agreement to a third party. Finally, the contract specifies the 
domicilia of the parties and outlines further miscellaneous legal clauses to the 
purchase agreement.    
 
In certain cases, suppliers enter into a financial assistance agreement with Sappi 
Forests. This agreement, called a MAP Agreement 1, stipulates the background of the 
applicant, the duration of the arrangement and an exact schedule of the growing and 
harvesting of specific species of trees. This agreement, moreover, stipulates the rate of 
interest to be paid to the company together with notification of a  liability for finance 
charges. The terms of repayment are specified by way of a deduction of the financial 
assistance received from payments made with respect to the supply of timber under 
the timber supply agreement. Furthermore, the conditions that apply in the event of 
the non-supply of timber to the company, for whatever reason, are outlined in this 
agreement. The supplier, applying for financial assistance, should be the registered 
owner of the stated property, and, if a loan in excess of R50 000 is made, then the 
supplier is obligated to register a covering mortgage bond in favour of Sappi Forests. 
In certain cases where the supplier plants in excess of 500 hectares the company may 
enforce a timber servitude on the supplier as an additional measure to  enforce the 
contract. The contract, moreover, stipulates the general obligations of the supplier and  30
includes conditions that enforce the supplier to comply with all environmental and 
silvicultural requirements. The contracted supplier, moreover, must sell the specified 
timber to Sappi Forests when the trees are at a specific age at a market related price 
relative to the area in which the mill is established. The MAP Agreement 1 includes 
the provision of free technical advice to the supplier up to a stated  number of visits 
per year and outlines the risk-insurance requirements to be met by the grower who 
shall forward a copy of the insurance agreement to the company.  
 
A different supply arrangement is used to contract small-scale farmers under the 
Project Grow arrangement. The Grow Agreement involves an arrangement whereby 
the Sappi Forest division supports the supplier both financially and technically. The 
duration of the arrangement is specified and the terms of assistance outlined. 
Assistance is received i n the form of an initial interest free loan for planting, 
maintaining and weeding the timber. Sappi Forests also undertakes to provide 
seedlings. The grower must demonstrate they have all the necessary permits, licences 
and authority to grow timber on the  said property including the compliance of the 
Department of Water Affairs, the National-Provincial Environmental Authority and 
the Department of Agriculture. The grower undertakes to meet a range of obligations 
that include compliance with Sappi Forest's e nvironmental and silvicultural practices 
and access to inspection by all stipulated parties. The grower is obligated to sell the 
timber to Sappi Forest and this timber must comply with the stated mill specifications. 
The supplier must also comply with Sappi Forest's instructions to harvest the timber at 
a specific age. The price paid for timber is negotiated between the parties and will 
generally be the prevailing price. All risk of damage remains with the grower until it 
has crossed the weighbridge although timber that does not meet mill specifications 
may be rejected. The agreement, furthermore, cedes the grower’s rights to the 
purchase price as a measure to provide additional security to the company. Finally, 
the contract outlines the conditions relating  to the breach of the contract by the grower 
and the manner in which the contract will be enforced. The grower is not allowed to 
cede any rights or obligations to third parties and all notices to the grower are to be 
delivered personally by the company or at monthly Project Grow meetings 
 
3.2.4  Transaction Characteristics  31
The interface between growers and the company mill, with respect to the continuous 
supply of large volumes of timber, generates a unique set of transaction 
characteristics. The number of deliveries of timber to the mill can be classified as the 
transaction characteristic of frequency and the value-degree to which the assets of the 
processor-grower are tied to the timber supply operation can be classified as 
transaction characteristic of asset specificity. Finally, the level of supply uncertainty 
has been classified as the transaction characteristic of uncertainty. The actual Sappi-
Saiccor timber supply transaction characteristics, illustrated in Table 15, were 
developed for the period 2000/1  and are based on the delivery of over 1.6 million tons 
of timber to the Sappi-Saiccor timber yard.  
 
Table 15: Transaction Characteristics of the timber supply chain 
Transaction Characteristic  Sappi-Saiccor 
1. General   
Types of Growers  Estate, Large, Medium, Small, Micro 
Hectares  > 500 000 hectares 
2. Frequency  High 
Tonnage Crushed  1.64 million tons 
Number of Deliveries  46669 
Administration   5.3 tons/transaction 
3. Asset Specificity  High 
Co-ordination Level  12 months/year/24 hrs /day 7 days/week 
road-rail, wood chips perishable, mill requirement 6 000 tons/day  
Value of Estates  > R 3.8 billion (net operating assets) 
Value of Plant  > R 5 billion (replacement cost) 
4. Uncertainty  Low-Moderate 
   Company Estates  Legislation, environmental issues, cost of inputs, physical variables, land 
constraints 
   Medium-large Growers  Timber Prices, physical variables, limited additional land, water cost, 
environmental 
   Small-scale Growers  Different time horizons, land tenure, cost of inputs, legislation, lack of 
access, moral hazard, theft 
   Processing  High Degree of leverage 
   Downstream  Volatile markets, changing nature of industry > high uncertainty 
 
Transaction Frequency 
The transaction characteristic of frequency, illustrated in Table 15, has been 
developed on the basis of the number of timber deliveries that are made to the timber 
supply yard. The frequency of timber deliveries is high because of the need to 
maximise the use of mill capacity of approximately 6 000 tons of timber per day, 
combined w ith the limited ability of the timber supply yard to stockpile the 
commodity. The timber supply yard, therefore, needs to be replenished on a daily 
basis to ensure that stock-out does not occur. The frequency of deliveries indicates 
that 46 669 truckloads  of timber resulted in the delivery of 1 663 520 tons of timber  32
involving 1 489 203 tons of gum and 174 317 tons of wattle. The number of deliveries 
by road exceeds the deliveries by rail with 33 176 delivered by road transport rigs and 
13493 deliveries (railway trucks). Of this total, approximately 86 % of road deliveries 
and 91 % of rail delivery, consist of gum, which accounted for 90 % of the timber 
processed by Sappi-Saiccor in 2001. On the basis of these records, this study found 
that a level of delivery frequency of in excess of 125 truckloads per day occurred for 
the full calendar year. According to the comparative levels of transaction frequency, 
developed by Williamson (1975) and Petersen and Wysocki (1997), this study has 
classified the level of transaction frequency as intermediate-high.  
 
Asset Specificity 
The mill group, which has a capacity of processing an average of 6000 tons of timber 
per day, employs four mills of different capacity. The net operating assets employed 
are currently valued at  R 1.3 billion, on a historical cost basis, that translates to a 
current replacement cost in excess of R5 billion for the year ending September, 2001. 
These assets are highly specific and have a low opportunity cost outside the timber 
industry. The assets,  moreover, are relatively immovable and are also site specific as 
the they have been located in close proximity to certain suppliers, harbour, rail and 
road facilities. The finished product is largely exported by ship and therefore the mill 
is site specific to the coast and harbour facilities. The factory assets also demonstrate 
high levels of asset specificity as a result of the need for high levels of co-ordination 
in order to maximise capacity usage. The timing of the delivery stream is, thus, co-
ordinated in order to stagger the arrival of over 46 000 vehicles-railway trucks per 
annum in order to maintain capacity, as well as, reduce the turnaround cost of the 
timber supply yard. The logistics of timber supply requires the processor to co-
ordinate a continuous delivery stream by road and rail from a diverse group of 
growers that are widely dispersed. The company must, moreover, ensure that each 
supplier is adhering to their contractual conditions. The high levels of co-ordination 
are also further influenced by the perishable nature of the semi processed raw 
commodity, namely, wood chips that are stored in an open yard and loose quality over 
time, especially in hot humid conditions. Finally, the level of asset specificity is 
increased by the timber specific  knowledge and skills that have evolved, and are 
locked into, the timber processing industry. On the basis of the historical records, in 
conjunction with the grading of transaction characteristics it would appear that the  33
intermediate-high levels of frequency, as a transaction characteristic, are matched 
with high levels of asset specificity in the processing operation group.  
 
Uncertainty of Supply 
The uncertainty of supply has, historically, been relatively low due to a number of 
factors. Firstly, the uncertainty of supply has been reduced by the monopsonistic 
nature of the timber industry where Sappi Limited is a major player. Secondly, the 
company estates have, historically, produced more than 50% of the timber processed 
by Sappi-Saiccor and uncertainty o f supply was further reduced by the site specificity 
of many growers who are located within a fifty kilometre radius of the Saiccor Mill. 
Thirdly, uncertainty is reduced by the long-term nature of timber production. Sappi 
Forest division is, in this regard, able to manipulate the supply of timber according to 
annual mill requirements and standing timber can, therefore, be felled if required or 
maintained until a future time when it is required. The economic viability of the 
standing timber is not affected d ue to the annual growth rate of this commodity. The 
uncertainty of supply has, therefore, been a function of the reliability of the company 
plantations and medium and large growers, combined with the normal agronomic and 
climatic variables that prevail in  the timber growing industry. The uncertainty of 
supply from medium and large suppliers, in this respect, is reduced by a stringent 
specification contract whilst the activities of Sappi Forest are fully internalised in the 
structure of Sappi Limited. Finally, deteriorating international markets for dissolving 
pulp, combined with increased levels of competition, have resulted in Sappi-Saiccor 
reducing capacity by 25%. Given the same volume of timber supply, the level of 
future uncertainty looks set to decrease as a result of downstream market pressures. 
Finally, uncertainty is partially a function of asset specificity. The reason for this is 
that the high level of fixed cost of the processing operation contributes towards 
increasing the degree of leverage, which in turn, increases the volatility of company 
cash flows. Since increased levels of volatility are associated with higher levels of 
uncertainty, the high level of asset specificity will tend to increase supply uncertainty. 
On the basis of the analysis of the historical records, combined with the current 
concerns of the timber, this study concludes that the current level of supply 
uncertainty can be classified as low to intermediate. Should Sappi Limited divest out 
of the timber growing industry, as has been suggested, the projected level of supply 
uncertainty is likely to increase.  34
 
3.2.5  The governance structure for the timber supply chain. 
According to Petersen and Wysocki (1996; 1997) and Williamson (1981; 1996; 1998; 
2000), transaction characteristics  that include high levels of frequency and asset 
specificity, combined with a measure of uncertainty, require higher levels of managed 
co-ordination than the spot market mechanisms. On the basis of transaction cost 
theory, the control of timber supply could be co-ordinated by a range of structures 
from specification contracting to full vertical integration on the vertical co-ordination 
continuum of Table 16. The contract characteristics of the supply arrangement 
suggest, however, that this structure would involve medium to high levels of managed 
co-ordination. The actual structure of control at Sappi-Saiccor does not necessarily 
contradict this and indicates that 50% of supply is controlled by specification 
contracting and 50% from the company plantations indicating an aggregated control 
structure in the centre of the continuum.  
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3.2.6  Summary and Conclusion 
The case study demonstrated that large numbers of micro growers, namely, in excess 
of 7000 farmers, can be incorporated in the timber growing operation of an 
agribusiness partner. The timber case study also demonstrates that transaction cost 
theory can be practically employed to test the level of managed co-ordination in an 
agricultural supply chain. A number of worrying concerns emerged from this case 
study. Firstly, the high level of company support to the growers has resulted in a cost 
to Sappi Limited of R10 million since 1989. The project appears to have been 
conceived  as a result of dual political economy-economic company objectives that 
translated into a paternalistic agribusiness approach to managing the smallholders. 
Secondly, the withdrawal of the administrative support of the agribusiness could  35
result in the abandonment of the project. The smallholders, at this stage, appear 
unlikely to organise their own affairs by way of a farmers association. Thirdly, the 
case study also supports the widespread contention that smallholders generate 
incremental transaction cost. F inally, the company’s control systems are also, in many 
instances, unable-reluctant to disclose the differential cost of dealing with 
smallholders.  
 
3.3   Small Growers in the Tea Industry: The Sapekoe Story 
 
3.3.1  Introduction 
This case study evaluates a  tea supply chain in Sapekoe Estates (Pty) Ltd - a company 
located in the Northern Province of South Africa. The case study focuses specifically 
on one of Sapekoe Estates’s plantations, namely Tshivusa Plantation situated in the 
former Venda Homeland. The c ase study specifically discusses the company as a 
grower compared to the contracted growers and will also discuss the nature of the 
contract between private growers and the company. 
 
The Tshivase Estate, along with the rest of the company actively promoted small 
farming after 1987 and by 1992 some 157 small farmers were engaged to supply 
green tea leaves to the factory. In January 1999, the estate had engaged 330 small 
farmers occupying an area of 192 hectares. Each farmer occupied an area of 
approximately 0.6 hectares where 0.5 hectares was under tea. This area was thought to 
be the optimum size that could be managed by the contracted farmers mostly drawn 
from the workforce. An annual contract was drawn up between the small farmer, as a 
grower, and the company as a processor. This contract was translated into the 
language of the farmer. The profile of the farmers indicated that a high percentage (as 
high as 96%) of mini farmers were females between the age of 22 and 53 years. Their 
profile indicated as many  as 50% were illiterate whilst 38 % had been educated at a 
junior primary school level only.  
 
A series of quarterly reviews maintained between January 1999 and April 2001 
reveals a trend of a reduction in company involvement with the mini farming project. 
The principal reasons included small farmers not adhering to plucking schedules, poor 
field practices, low yields and a lacking of an entrepreneurial ethos. In March 1999, it  36
was decided to reduce small farm projects from 330 people occupying 192 hectares to 
90 farmers occupying 67 hectares. In the period 1/4/1999 to 30/4/2001 the mini 
farmers complied with standards and demonstrated high levels of productivity. In 
1999 the small farmers improved productivity from 63.7 kilograms of green tea per 
labour unit per day to 99.9 kilograms. In 2000, weeding-fertilising operations were 
reported as satisfactory and plucking and pruning productivity often exceeded that of 
the estate. During this period all standards were maintained. The number of farmers 
reduced to 87, then 80 on the same area and by 31/10/2000 the company had the 
intention of expanding this number to 100. The mini farming project on Tshivase was 
terminated in June 2001 due to a change in legislation. The reasons for failure include 
the poor selection  of participants, the poor management skills of the small farmers, 
the limited duration of the contract, volatile world prices and major strikes in 1996 
where company workers intimidated the contracted farmers. The company also 
displayed a history of paternalism in the corporate culture, a high level of scepticism 
of company officials and the small farmers, who were originally employees, never 
became independent farmers. 
 
3.3.2  Tshivase Small Farm Contract 
The agreement is embodied in the form of a tea harvester agreement between the 
estate and the designated participant. The agreement stipulates a specified area as 
designated in the company records and actions both parties are regulated in terms of 
Section 45 Act 32 of 1994. This act controls the institution of any legal action 
providing for the enforcement of any rights under, or arising from the agreement, in 
the Magistrate Court which has jurisdiction in respect the estate in terms of Section 29 
(1) of the Act.  
 
3.3.3  Transaction characteristics 
The Tshivase Factory has processed an average 7 072 370 kilograms of green leaf tea 
in the period 1999 to 2001. The harvesting and delivery are co-ordinated and 
synchronised in order to maintain constant use of factory capacity which is estimated 
at 74 800 kilograms per day. On average, a single daily shift produces around 38 500 
kilograms which indicates that around 51.4 % only of Tshivase factory capacity is  37
utilised. The harvesting and delivery of green tea leaves co-ordinates some 36 
different fields occupying a n area of 577 hectares. Each field is plucked on an 8 to 12 
day cycle indicating a high level of labour management as the teams move from field 
to field according to the designated plucking programs. The plucking cycle results in 
each worker’s basket being weighed in the field and placed in a covered light delivery 
vehicle or tractor-trailer for delivery to the factory. The deliveries are weighed on 
entry to the processing operation and average out at around 1 500 kilograms per 
delivery. This would indicate that the factory receives in excess of 4 700 deliveries of 
green tea per annum. Each delivery should be offloaded in between 20 and 30 minutes 
and the perishability of green tea leaves increases the need for high levels of co-
ordination between the factory and the growers. In addition, the number of company 
weighing-inspection transactions in the field averages at around one transaction per 
45  – 60 kilograms per labour unit (June 2001 Plucking Summary). This would suggest 
that there is a minimum of 25 weighing-inspection transactions in the field for an 
average delivery of 1 500 kilograms. This would suggest some 117 500-field 
transactions per annum. 
 
The high levels of frequency, as a transaction characteristic, are matched with high 
levels of asset specificity in the factory group with lower levels of asset specificity for 
the agricultural division. The assets of the Tshivase Estate factory were valued at R 
7.56 million at gross book value as at the 30
th of June, 2001. These assets are highly 
specific to t he tea industry and have a low opportunity cost outside the industry. The 
assets, moreover, are relatively immovable and are also site specific as they have been 
centralised in relation to the company estates and out-grower suppliers. The factory 
assets also demonstrate high levels of asset specificity as a result of the need for high 
levels of co-ordination in order to maximise the use of capacity. The co-ordination of 
over 4 700 deliveries from 36 different fields has been that every field is plucked on 
an 8 to 12 day basis. And every delivery is scheduled to have a turnaround time of 30 
minutes and less. The high levels of co-ordination are further influenced by the 
perishable nature of the green tea leaves that rapidly loose quality if they are exposed 
after cutting.  
 
The uncertainty of supply has, historically, been relatively low due to the fact that the 
company estates have produced more than 96% of the processed tea leaves. The  38
uncertainty of supply has therefore been a function of the normal biological and 
climatic variables experienced in the agricultural sector. The uncertainty of supply 
has, at times, been increased by the unavailability of labour, labour disputes and other 
forms of absenteeism. Small farm supply has been less reliable than the company 
estates and is cited as one of the factors contributing to the abandonment of this form 
of supply. The uncertainty of future supply could be affected by the land tenure 
situation of the company who currently leases all of its land from local tribal 
authorities. The downstream uncertainty in the tea industry is, however, elevated 
because of the volatility of world tea prices. The transaction characteristic of 
uncertainty is also increased because of the high level of fixed cost of the processing 
facilities where the need to maintain mill capacity is vitally important. The company 
therefore has a high degree of leverage with respect to its fixed cost structure and any 
type of breakdown in the processing facilities, or alternatively, major shifts in climatic 
patterns, have a significant impact on the company cash flows.   
 
3.3.4  Governance structure in the tea supply chain  
The tea supply chain of Tshivase Estate displays the transaction characteristics of high 
levels of frequency, asset specificity and a  moderate level of cane supply uncertainty. 
These transaction characteristics, in turn influenced by crop specific characteristics, 
clearly demonstrate that the Tshivase Estate requires high levels of managed co-
ordination in order to co-ordinate large volumes of a highly perishable raw 
commodity that are supplied by the growers. It is therefore logical to argue that the 
Tshivase Supply Chain would not be able to function without high levels of managed 
co-ordination. The adopted governance form has resulted  from the need to co-ordinate 
the high volumes of supply to maintain mill capacity at around 38 000 kilograms of 
green tea per day. The financial performance of the Tshivase Estate is severely 
affected if plant capacity is not utilised during the year, as t here are moderately high 
levels of fixed factory cost. This study therefore has demonstrated that governance 
form is a function of transaction characteristics and that governance forms evolve in 
order to minimise total cost, rather than just transaction cost as stated by the 
proponents of transaction cost theory. Organisation structure will thus impact on 
financial performance. In the case of the Tshivase Estate it would be clearly  39
impossible to obtain and co-ordinate the supply of green tea leaves on the s pot 
market. The company, moreover, is unable to expand it’s own capacity from estate 
type supply because of an inability to acquire additional permanent land inputs 
because of a limited land market in conjunction with land tenure problems. Mill 
capacity, m oreover, exceeds own supply capacity so Tshivase must acquire additional 
supply from out-growers or the mini farmer source. The Tshivase Estate has, 
therefore, clearly, adopted the optimum governance form over time in support of the 
original proponent of t ransaction cost theory, namely, Ronald Coase (1937). The 
Company has, therefore, clearly, adopted the optimum governance form in order to 
co-ordinate the large range of growers. 
 
3.3.5  Grower Performance  
The comparison of the growers has been evaluated on the basis of the plucking 
performance summaries that have been summarised for the period 1996 to 2000. The 
plucking performance evaluates the productivity of the estate and the mini farmers on 
the basis of the kilograms of green tea leaves delivered to the factory per hectare 
farmed and on the basis of the kilograms of made tea per hectare farmed. A further 
measure of efficiency also examines the green leaves picked per day per worker and 
expresses this measure as the yield per labour unit. The results, as illustrated in Table 
19, suggest that mini farmers have outperformed the estate between 1996 and 2001 
except for the period 1998/9. The mini farmers, on average, have been 7.26 % more 
productive per hectare in terms of green leaves delivered to the factory, as well as, 
made tea than the balance of the estate. The labour yield per unit for the estate has 
been calculated on the basis of the conventional hand plucking technique and again 
the results indicate that the mini farmers have outperformed the estate  in the period 
1996 to 2001 except for 1998/9. The results for 1999/2000 were not available but, on 
average, the mini farmer yield per unit was 13.9 % higher than the balance of the 
estate.  
 
3.3.6  Conclusion  40
This case study provided useful insights into what should NOT be done with respect 
to the design of a smallholder linkage or out-grower project. Firstly, the company 
officials never viewed the contracted growers as independent farmers but rather as 
former employees. The autonomy of contracted farmers was, therefore, extremely 
limited. The design of the project, moreover, was rather directed at avoiding labour 
union problems rather than stimulating small-scale supply. The second important 
feature was the micro nature of the growers who operated on less than a hectare 
suggesting the need to evaluate a critical minimum size farm in any crop category. In 
this respect, there is some correlation with the timber case study. Finally, the reasons 
for the failure of this project are contradicted by the apparent competitive grower 
performance of the contracted farmers suggesting that the official company reason for 
the closure of the project, namely, the incompetence of the growers, was prompted by 
other reasons.   
 
Table 19: The Grower Performance: Sapekoe Estates 
Season  1996/7  1997/8  1998/9  1999/2000  2000/1 
           
Estate Plucking            
Area in hectares  379.38 ha  436.47  385.92  510.92  509.92 
Green Leaf produced in kilograms  2700155 kg  4631349  4579033  6007174  6914557 
Yield per hectare Green Leaf kg/ha 











Yield per labour unit/ha green leaf*  31.8  49.8  46.5    48.0 
           
Mini Farmers           
Area  198.82  141.73  192.28  67.08  67.08 
Green Leaf Produced  1647184  1805906  1872559  895872  947914 
Yield per Hectare Green Leaf 











Yield per labour unit/ha green leaf  43.4  53.4  40.3    60.2 
           
Total           
Area  578.20  578.20  578.20  578.00  577.00 
Green leaf Produced  4347339  6437255  6451592  6903046  7862471 
Yield per hectare Green Leaf 















3.4   Dealing with price risk and access to markets in the grain industry: An 
innovative approach to link farmers with grain markets.  
 
3.4.1  Introduction 
Farmers producing grain and field crops on dry land are usually faced by two types of 
risk namely price and production risk. Production risk relates to the possibility of crop  41
failure due to any number of reasons. This risk can be managed through crop 
insurance (or often referred to as input insurance), which protects the farmer against 
crop failure. However, as technology and markets evolve, better means of risk 
aversion or control can be applied. Using precision farming techniques and planting 
the best variety on the market, farmers can manage the production risk to a certain 
extent, but there are still a huge number of variables (and thus potential risks) present 
in agricultural production.  
 
Price risk can be managed very effectively by the use of market-based solutions like 
derivative instruments (contracts and options). By following a low risk approach to 
hedging (price insurance), a simple strategy or portfolio can be implemented at 
relatively low cost to insure a pre-determined minimum floor price. With further 
management of this portfolio a potentially higher price can be realised, which will 
obviously benefit the c lient and his/her banker. Secondly, by actively managing the 
hedged portfolio the costs of hedging can be considerably reduced.  
 
Dealing with these risks is one aspect farmers have to deal with but then farmers are 
also faced with marketing decisions. The crop harvested needs to be sold to a suitable 
buyer and the price needs to be negotiated. Previously in South Africa the various 
marketing boards took on this role on behalf of all role players. Following the process 
of deregulation farmers now have to identify their own marketing opportunities. This 
is especially difficult for those farmers that are now emerging from a subsistence 
mode of production into some commercial production.  
 
Increasing production costs relative to capital costs and equity during  recent years has 
meant there are increased demand for short-term production credit from financial 
institutions. Many farmers do not have additional assets (or no assets at all) to provide 
as security for such finance. This situation will make it almost impossible for many 
farmers, especially farmers from disadvantaged communities, to enter agriculture and 
produce for the market.  
 
This section reports on a very interesting and unique concept whereby financial 
institutions are now adapting their financial products to accommodate this particular 
need and in the process creating linkages into the input as well as output market. The  42
contractual relationship involves a process whereby production credit is linked to the 
risk and output market. It is thus a typical example of interlocking factor markets 
(between output and input markets) but in addition the facilitating organisation or 
financier is undertaking a hedging strategy on behalf of the farmers. In essence the 
‘product’ becomes a sort of one-stop-shop whereby the client (usually without 
collateral) is now able to access the normal products of commercial banks, such as 
input financing, hedging and pricing services and output insurance.  
 
A number of financial institutions in South Africa have recently used this concept to 
form successful joint ventures with other partners in the commercial agricultural 
sector, to facilitate the integration of small-scale farmers from our disadvantaged 
communities into the commercial sector. For the first time in South Africa t his type of 
arrangement provides a solution to the problem that the farmers in disadvantaged 
communities are too small to participate in derivative markets. Derivative market 
instruments are usually specified in 100-ton contracts, which therefore exclude m any 
small-scale farmers from utilising these instruments to minimise price risk.  
 
The innovation is basically  related to the fact that small scale farmers are now 
grouped together to give them a way into a market which is closed to any one 
producing less  than 200t ( more than one futures contract).  Currently derivatives as a 
risk management tool is only available to participants producing more than a 100t and 
who can carry the hedging costs which is a minimum of R18000 for every 100t 
contract. These requirements make hedging as a management tool inaccessible to 
most small-scale farmers. Also the understanding and use of these tools is absolutely 
crucial to commercial producers. Generally if a producer can not use these 
instruments because either being to small or unskilled in its uses he/she will not be 
able to receive financial assistance from a commercial bank to finance production. 
The uniqueness and innovation of this product is in that it was structured with exactly 
that in mind and will over time integrate small-scale farmers into the mainstream 
agriculture fully equipped and financially capable to participate in the market.  
 
To a large degree this approach lean heavily on the philosophy of supply chain 
management, by combining all activities, from production finance to price risk. It 









same time assist the farmer through extension services and the entire spectrum of the 
marketing functions to ensure that his crop will be sold at profitable levels. At the 
same time it protects the loan book of the financier against defaults which could arise 
through price risk. 
 
3.4.2  The basic foundations of this type of arrangement 
This joint venture in this case study was established to do exactly all of the above, i.e. 
loan book expansion, actively managed hedged portfolio, lowered hedging cost, 
minimum or higher realised prices, and lower risk exposure to all stakeholders by 
utilising and pooling of resources, expertise and existing links. 
 
Price risk has for ages been one of the biggest risk factors faced by farmers. With the 
deregulation of the maize industry, grain producers had to turn to the derivative 
markets for price insurance. By using the derivative markets, they aim to fix a floor 
price ahead of harvesting, and maybe an even higher price once the crop has been 
harvested and sold. One of the problems faced by these producers is the complex and 
potentially disastrous nature of this kind of market activity. To participate in 
derivative markets, one needs a high level of understanding and even training to 
operate safely within it. Furthermore depending on the strategy followed it can also be 
very demanding on ones cash flow as margin movements can occur very quickly and 
very s teeply. However, with the volatile grain prices since deregulation there is no 
doubt that these market instruments have to be used if one wishes to secure reliable 
profit margins over time.  
 
Graphical representation of the structure of the joint venture:  
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Since the majority of crop production takes place with production loans, the lender 
himself is also affected by price risk, since adverse price movements have a negative 
effect on loan repayment ability. In would thus be to the advantage of the lender if the 
client can manage his marketing process in such a way that continually receives a net 
price, which will ensure a positive profit margin from a price perspective. It will thus 
eliminate the price risk from the loan book. The farmer will still be faced with 
production and yield risk, and thus in essence so will the lender, but this was always 
the case. One of the biggest risk factors, price, can at least now be eliminated which 
will hold obvious benefits to the lender. It will however require from the lender to 
investigate the client’s hedge portfolio from time to time to ensure that the client does 
follow an appropriate strategy or even from the lender to build and manage the 
strategy on behalf of  the client, and so ensure that the lenders loan book is protected 
from price risk. This however requires the necessary infrastructure and technical 
expertise, which could potentially be very costly and time consuming to set-up. 
  
Even if the client do succeed in successfully managing his hedge portfolio he then still 
have to find a contracting party to take the physical crop of his hands, since physical 
delivery into the spot market is preferred to delivery to SAFEX. Contracting the 
physical crop is also required to immunize the loan book as much as possible, since 
SAFEX only really assist in protecting against price movements, as for physical 
delivery to SAFEX can be very expensive. Physical contracting thus creates the 
opportunity of saving on transport cost, handling fees and the potential to benefit from 
basis risk. This aspect unfortunately does require very stringent control over the 
progress of physical production. Even more so than under normal circumstances were 
Grain Farmer 
Production 





producers do not make use of forward c ontracting, for a failure to deliver a preset 
amount of product could result in a form of contract breaching.  
 
The working of this arrangement is illustrated by the following example: 
 
Farmer A applies for a production loan at the financial institution. O nce the 
application has been approved, the bank purchases put options on the client’s behalf 
although the options will be seeded to the bank. The premium on the put option is 
added to the production loan and the Farmer signs the increased production loan. 
Let’s assume the put option was purchased with a strike price of R1200/ton and the 
premium payable on that strike price was R100/ton. By buying the put option, the 
financial institution has created a floor price for Farmer A of R1200/ton. 
 
If the price increases to let’s say R1500/ton, the option became worthless and expires 
but the client still remains responsible for the repayment of the loan. There was no 
price risk involved due to the price increase. But, what is going to happen when the 
price drops to  say R1000/ton? The option gain in value and the financial institution 
can sell the option to another party on SAFEX. The profit generated on the option can 
be used as a payment on the outstanding loan amount. Thus, creating the same effect 
as if the financial institution is writing off the loan because of default as a result of the 
price drop. It is also noteworthy that the further the price declines the higher the 
option profit will be and thus the more the loan will be repaid by the bank until the 
loan becomes fully paid and any further profits will then be given to the client. 
 
A number of individuals (facilitators, grain traders, etc) have put this principal in 
practice by doing this type of arrangement with groups of small-scale maize and 
sunflower farmers in the North West Province and the Free State Province of South 
Africa. 
 
4.  Building successful links between agribusiness and smallholders: Lessons 
from the case studies and the literature 
 
A series of general proposals are developed in this section that can be incorporated in 
the design of out grower or contracting arrangements with smallholders. The  46
proposals have been formulated on the basis of the results of the case studies, the 
lessons of the international experience of contracting and, in certain i nstances, the use 
of transaction cost theory. The lessons of history include the importance of screening 
future partners, the need to understand how historical and institutional legacies have 
influenced contracting arrangements and the advantages of creating mutual asset 
specificity between the contracting parties. Additional lessons include the role of 
logistics, the need to assess start-up cost, the need to invest in new partners and 
promote access to facilities, the importance of commodity characteristics and the 
implication of contracting with large numbers of small-scale farmers. Finally, other 
important lessons include the presence of a competitive fresh market, the role of the 
state, the role of trust-contract conflict, property rights economics, the  strength of 
agribusiness management, the volatility of world prices and the important role of 
women.  
 
•  The careful screening-identification of future partners is a key success factor. 
Farmers who have a record of previous interaction with agribusiness appear to be 
more successful contracting partners (Levin, 1988; Porter & Phillips-Howard, 
1997a; 1997b). The three case studies all appear to have developed a data bank of 
farmer details for each prospective new farmer. In the case of the sugar industry, 
however, the screening process took more cognisance of the entrepreneurial 
ability of the prospective applicant, whereas, in the timber industry, it would 
appear as if a majority of applicants were accepted. Screening costs, involving 
large numbers of applicants, can be significantly reduced if these activities are 
assisted by a representative farmers association or, alternatively, if the 
agribusiness contracts with the farmers’ association rather than the individual 
farmer. The benefits of screening, moreover,  can be increased if the process 
includes a business aptitude test, a credit check and a list of assets-collateral. 
Finally, the screening process should capture the location, logistics and 
communication channels of the applicant in order to ascertain the s patial dynamics 
of the project. 
 
•  An understanding of the historical legacies and institutional environment will 
contribute towards a better understanding of the future transaction cost of  47
contracting with large numbers of small-scale farmers. Transaction c ost theory 
suggests that the transaction characteristics of agricultural supply chains are a 
function of a range historical-social variables. All of the case studies confirm the 
pervasive long term influence on economic performance of historical legacies, 
that have influenced transaction cost as a result of the effect of culture, the historic 
concentration of industry, the influence on property rights economics, the level of 
regulation and the concentration of political power. It is suggested, therefore, that 
the design of contracting structures incorporates an understanding of how 
historical legacies influence transaction cost. Appropriate design measures can 
then be taken to reduce transaction cost in two ways. Firstly, many industries have 
the power to lobby for changes in the institutional framework and Williamson 
(2000) suggests that this form of economising can significantly reduce transaction 
cost. South African agribusiness, in particular, has the bargaining power to lobby 
for property rights amendments and some form of subsidy-tax relief for 
undertaking smallholder start-up costs. Secondly, the design of organisation 
structures can be undertaken more efficiently if an understanding of the dynamics 
of transaction characteristics is incorporated.  
 
•  The  creation of mutual asset specificity reduces uncertainty and raises the exit 
costs of both sets of contracting partners. The case studies in the sugar and timber 
industries indicate that the business partner is confronted with significantly higher 
levels o f asset specificity than the contracted farmers. The industry and site 
specific processing assets, in the sugar and timber case studies, were valued at R2 
billion and R5 billion respectively. Conversely, the contracted farmers owned 
fewer assets that were  of a more general nature. The South African sugar firm, 
TSB, in particular has a very high level of asset specificity and relies on 
contracted out-growers for 80 % of sugarcane supply. Transaction cost theory 
would suggest that a higher level of managed co-ordination is needed in the 
absence of inducing higher levels of mutual asset specificity or other interlocking 
factors. Mutual asset specificity can be pursued by way of farmers associations 
undertaking the purchase of industry specific capital inputs. T he Swaziland sugar 
farmers associations appear to have increased mutual asset specificity by investing 
in sugar specific plant and equipment that is too lumpy for the individual farmer.  48
The agribusiness can attempt to act as a facilitator of finance, in this regard, to 
increase the interlocking nature of the arrangement. Finally, the agribusiness can 
examine other ways of influencing mutual asset specificity by way of configuring 
the technology of the grower-processor operations in such a way that only the 
agribusiness possesses the technology to perform a specific element of the 
growing operation. Contracted growers, for instance, in the processed tomato 
sector, require specific harvesting technology that can be owned and operated by 
the agribusiness (Rehber, 1998).  
 
•  The design of the logistics of small-scale farm supply is a crucial success factor. 
An understanding of the relationship between commodity characteristics and 
logistics could be incorporated to reduce transaction cost (Delgado, 1999). The 
timber case study, in particular, illustrates the increased level of transaction cost 
generated by large numbers of small-scale farmers that are spatially dispersed. 
The agribusiness, at the outset, can evaluate the transaction frequency of visits, 
inputs and f armer deliveries with the distance from the processor, the nature of the 
roads and the available communication system. The transaction cost of logistics 
can be fundamentally reduced by allowing a farmers’ association to provide the 
necessary inputs, as wel l as, organise the logistics of small-scale supply. The 
timber case study, in particular, suggests Sappi Forest should contract with a 
farmers association for an aggregated monthly volume of timber instead of 
contracting individually with the 7 100 micro f armers. In the absence of a farmers’ 
association the agribusiness can improve efficiency by establishing the nature of 
the roads, access and communication systems of the proposed project. The timber 
industry, in this regard, indicates that certain areas are impassable in the wet 
season and that declining levels of rural security and high levels of ethnic conflict 
have resulted in a lack of access except for local community members. Finally, the 
agribusiness can assemble and program the transaction cost of l ogistics by 
capturing the spatial dispersion of the farmers, the number of transactions and the 
average distance to the processor.  
 
•  The careful assessment and treatment of start-up cost is a key project evaluation 
procedure. In many instances, the agribusiness must commit long-term resources  49
to establish small-scale farmer projects. Sappi Limited, for instance, has invested 
ten years and R10 million to establish small-scale tree farming in Kwazulu-Natal 
whilst the Transvaal Sugar Company in Mpumalanga incurs an annual cost of in 
excess of R3 million to ensure the viability of small-scale supply Start-up cost 
will, generally, be higher if non traditional crops are being introduced because of 
the need to train farmers and introduce complex technology. The start-up cost, 
moreover, can include the linking of small-scale farmers to institutions like banks, 
insurance companies and suppliers. The lack of access to these facilities, in 
conjunction with infrastructure deficiencies, has been cited as a prime cause of 
project failure (Gittinger, 1982). The assessment and treatment of start-up cost 
will influence the investment decision. This study proposes that the incidence of 
smallholder contracting in South Africa will be negatively influenced if 
agribusiness is expected to bear this cost. The assessment of start-up cost, 
therefore, should form the basis of lobbying for government subsidy-relief or 
alternatively to charge back this amount to the farmers. If the contracted farmers 
are unable to amortize start-up cost,  the viability of the operation should be 
questioned from the outset. 
 
•  Certain commodity characteristics are better suited to contracting. Crops, in 
particular, that are labour intensive in the growing operation and display 
economies of scale in processing, are more suited to smallholder contracting 
(Delgado, 1999). The case studies in the sugar and timber industries did not 
demonstrate particular growing economies for smallholder family labour yet these 
growers, mostly matched larger growers with respect to the cost efficiency of 
production. The reason for this ability to compete with larger growers appears to 
stem from the ability to avoid overhead cost rather than the productivity of family 
labour. The results of the case studies suggest that smallholders  maybe able to 
compete as growers with commodities that are not particularly labour intensive 
thus further relaxing the suggested product range of Delgado (1999). Commodity 
characteristics can also be linked to transaction cost for design purposes. 
Commodities, for instance, that are perishable will require higher levels of co-
ordination cost than those that can be stockpiled. Alternatively, commodities that 
have long growing periods may require a different contract structure from annual  50
or shorter term crops. Growers, for instance, in the timber industry sometimes 
receive advances for work performed against the sale of the future crop. The 
design of contracting structures can thus consider developing a commodity 
characteristics profile and use this, together with processing capacity, as the basis 
for determining the transaction characteristics of frequency, asset specificity and 
uncertainty to determine an optimum structure. The case studies clearly illustrate 
the ability to plot actual transaction and contracting characteristics with the 
optimum governance form. The actual governance form can then be compared and 
moved along the vertical co-ordination continuum of managed co-ordination. 
Agribusinesses that incorporate both contracted growers and fully integrated 
estates can, possibly, employ a looser form of specification than those who rely 
solely on contracted supplies. Finally, the inappropriate choice of technology, a 
function of the commodity characteristics, has been cited a cause of project failure 
(Gittinger, 1982). The agribusiness often has a choice of technology alternatives 
and it has been suggested that if a labour intensive option does not detract from 
performance, then this option should be chosen to better suit the competencies of 
the farm family. 
 
•  Contracting with large numbers of small-scale suppliers has been associated with 
higher levels of transaction cost (Runsten & Key, 1996; Rehber, 1998; Key & 
Runsten, 1999). The transaction costs of small-scale suppliers in the case studies 
clearly exceeded those of larger suppliers. The case studies demonstrated that 
transaction cost can be broken down into a series of cost elements including start-
up cost, growing costs, harvesting-delivery costs and administration costs. The 
economics of contracting w ould suggest there is no reason for the agribusiness to 
choose small-scale suppliers over larger growers if all the contracted parties are 
paid the same price and deliver the same level of quality. This being the case, it is 
necessary to take specific steps to either avoid the cost or, alternatively, charge 
back the differential cost to the contracted party. Recurrent small farmer 
transaction cost can be avoided by contracting with a larger entity like a farmers 
association who undertakes the administration of its members interests. The 
farmer association, moreover, can be responsible for configuring it's members 
with agribusiness requirements including training, extension, technology  51
acquisition, provision of commodity inputs and co-ordinating harvesting-delivery 
schedules. The agribusiness firm can increase the successful operation of the 
farmers association by acquiring representation in the management structure, as 
well as, allowing the association to be represented in it's own management 
structure. The a gribusiness, moreover, can further influence the efficiency of the 
farmers association by ensuring this body maintains records, has no political 
agenda, is limited in size and that it contains sufficient professional management. 
A different approach to reducing transaction cost for the agribusiness can be 
engineered by way of charging back differential transaction cost to the small-scale 
grower by using activity based costing systems to identify the smallholders’ 
incremental use of company resources. The case studies illustrate that differential 
administration cost can be charged back to the grower on the basis of identifying 
accounting transactions as the primary cost driver. Activity based costing can also 
be applied to charge back incremental growing, harvesting and delivery 
transaction cost. The timber case study clearly indicates that the agribusiness cost 
of timber from small-scale suppliers is higher than medium-large growers and the 
company plantations. Finally, activity based costing can be used as a  basis to 
highlight the incremental cost of recurring smallholder transactions with a view to 
lobbying the South African government for assistance-relief.  
 
•  The history of contracting demonstrates that the presence of competitive fresh 
markets for grower o utlets increases the level of uncertainty of supply. 
Transaction cost theory explains the increased level of cost to the agribusiness in 
terms of higher levels of opportunism by the grower. The occasional opportunistic 
sale of timber in rural Kwazulu-Natal highlights this problem that was well 
documented in the Mexican tomato-growing sector (Runsten & Key, 1996). The 
unauthorised sale of the contracted commodity can especially problematic in the 
case of projects involving large numbers of smallholders in developing countries 
with poorly defined-upheld property rights economics. The agribusiness, in this 
type of scenario, may not be able to legally enforce the contract because of the 
incremental cost of first dealing through an inefficient system and secondly 
because of the micro nature of the contract. The agribusiness can reduce 
unauthorised sales by securing an agreement with competitors with regard to the  52
purchase of the commodity. Alternatively, the chances of contract enforcement are 
improved if market b ased prices are paid for the raw commodity. The agribusiness 
could also locate outside the area of the competitive fresh market.  
 
•  Fafchamps and Minten (1999) suggest that trust based relationships can be a 
dominant interlocking factor that can contribute  to contract enforcement. 
Transaction cost theory suggests that trust influences uncertainty as a result of it's 
effect on the opportunistic behaviour of the contracting parties. Farmer distrust, 
combined with a perceived loss of autonomy and feelings of exploitation, has 
been widely cited as a major cause of contracting failures in developing countries 
(Glover, 1987; Clapp, 1994; Watts, 1994). It has been suggested, in this regard, 
that the level of trust that can be engendered between the parties will influence the 
success of future South African contracting arrangements. The development of 
trust is especially important given South Africa's history of colonialism and 
apartheid (Porter & Phillips-Howard, 1997a; 1997b).  
 
•  Gow et al (2000) have demonstrated that contract innovations, or interlocking 
factors, can contribute towards reduced transaction cost. These factors include the 
administration of growers’ affairs, the company acting as financier and supplier of 
inputs and high levels of involvement in local  communities. The timber industry 
case study demonstrates the interlocking nature of a contract that provides 
financial assistance and/or part payment for certain phases in the growing process. 
Colchao (1999) suggests the agribusiness can successfully induce contract 
enforcement by acting as a banker to the contracted farmer. The agribusiness, 
moreover, is able to compete in the banking sector as a result of better information 
combined with the ability to enforce contracts in alternate ways. In this regard,  the 
business could attempt to own-control the assets and technology of the grower, as 
well as, play a role in the financing of these assets (Colchao, 1999). The timber 
case study, moreover, suggested that the small-holder management company, 
Lima, has effectively become a high cost interlocking mechanism because it is so 
integrated in the everyday affairs of contracted growers.  
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•  Contract enforcement is an important success factor with respect to small-scale 
farmer contracting. In many instances contract enforcement is difficult to ensure 
through the legal process and the logic of contracting with large numbers of 
smallholders is a questionable issue (Runsten & Key, 1996; Rehber, 1998; 
Sofranko et al, 2000). The representation of farmers’ interests by way of a 
farmers’ association will reduce the agribusiness cost of enforcement. 
Alternatively, the agribusiness can employ tribal authorities to enforce the 
contractual conditions. The logic, for instance, of attempting to legally enforce a 
set of contract conditions with respect to a farmer on less than a hectare of 
communal tenure land, as was the case in the timber study, is questionable. The 
case studies in the sugar industry suggest that contract enforcement is achieved 
through the mutual interests of the parties rather than through the judicial system. 
The use of a renewable contract is suggested as a cost effective way to achieve 
enforcement (Key & Runsten, 1999). If suppliers have not performed in the 
previous year their contracts are simply not renewed the following year. 
Conversely, the firm in the timber case study appeared to pursue contract 
enforcement by way of registering a timber servitude or bond, Williamson (2000) 
suggests that transaction cost can also be reduced by way of first order 
economising. This approach attempts to favourably influence the prevailing 
institutional environment in order to influence the economics of property rights. 
South African agribusiness, in this regard, has the potential to influence legislation 
that will reduce transaction cost. Legislation that could be amended includes land 
tenure, the water act, the role of tribal authorities, the labour act, the rights of the 
female farmer, the national heritage acts and the conservation laws. The timber 
case study is an example of legislation that substantially increases transaction cost 
by way of a plethora of acts and legislation that must be complied with in order to 
register a new grower.  
 
•  The grower response to prices and other opportunities is suggested as a key long-
term issue that can influence the stability of the contracting arrangements. A long-
term perspective on prices could contribute to locking contracted growers into a 
commodity and ensuring continuity of supply in depressed conditions (Levin, 
1988; Watts, 1994; Abbott, 1994).   54
 
•  A number of other issues influence the success of smallholder contracting 
schemes. These issues include the role of female farmer, the control of land and 
water, the role of the state, the household food security issue and land degradation. 
The role of the female farmer is especially important in many developing country 
contracting arrangements (Carney, 1988) and Gittinger (1982) suggests that a 
failure to understand the social environment is a prime cause of project failure. 
The case studies  in the sugar and timber industries suggest female household 
members supply high levels of labour inputs. Agribusiness in South Africa can 
contribute towards the future role of the female farmer by securing legislation that 
ensures full representation-rights for the female farmer in communal tenure areas. 
It is also suggested that agribusiness payment for the commodity should be 
directed to the household member responsible for supply. The role of tribal 
authorities in communal areas will also need to be configured to promoting gender 
access in rural areas. The issue of who controls land and water in the contract 
relationship can influence the success of the arrangement. If the land and water is 
owned by the contracted growers then the decision making autonomy of the 
farmer is not affected, however, if they are owned by the agribusiness the 
conditions of use should be mutually developed and fully understood by both 
parties. Another key issue is the role of the state. In many developing countries the 
state has b een an active partner of small-scale contracting projects. It has been 
suggested that if the state is a partner then, at the very least, it should provide 
some form of financial assistance. The equity objectives of the state can also be 
investigated with r espect to their impact on economic performance. Finally, the 
issue of food security and land degradation can influence the long-term viability 
of contracting arrangements. Monoculture contracting has been associated with a 
reduction in food crops and an increase in pollution (Rehber, 1998; Pasour, 1998; 
Wolz et al, 1999). Agribusiness can respond to these threats by encouraging 
farmers to grow food crops on a percentage of their land and pro-actively 
investigating the long-term threat of growing technologies on sustainable land use.     
  
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  55
 
The results of the case studies, combined with the potential of the South African 
agribusiness sector, suggest that large numbers of small-scale farmers could be linked 
to agribusiness partners by way of contracting arrangements. The proposals 
suggested, however, that a “fresh approach” to the design of these arrangements is 
required. This approach combined the lessons of history, conceptual developments in 
economic theory and the results of the case studies. The results, generally, suggested 
that the transaction characteristics of the grower-processing operations influenced the 
level of managed co-ordination required, that smallholder transaction cost exceeded 
that of larger suppliers and that smallholder production efficiency matched that of 
larger growers. The design of proposals, in response to these results, indicated a 
number of potential solutions that included the formation of a farmers association, the 
possibility of state assistance or the  need to develop costing systems to identify, and 
charge back, incremental transaction cost to small-scale growers.  
 
The case studies also suggest the pervasive, and long-term, influence of social-
historical legacies on the economic performance of respective industry sectors. More 
specifically, the case studies demonstrate how the institutional structure in Southern 
Africa has been influenced by the earlier experience of colonialism-apartheid 
combined with the original concentrations of industry and infrastructure. The South 
African case studies, for instance, suggest that two hundred years of apartheid-
colonialism have fundamentally influenced principal-agent costs, the concentrations 
of infrastructure and the property rights economics of the country. The t imber case 
study, for instance, indicated the plethora of regulations-procedures required by a 
prospective grower to comply with the requirements of both local and national 
authorities before a water permit was granted. Clearly, the transaction cost incurred by 
the agribusiness of assisting these growers was influenced by both the degree of 
regulation involved, as well as, the inefficiency of local government authorities. The 
current, somewhat inflexible, labour act in South Africa is a further example of h ow 
the costs of labour contracting have been influenced by a government attempting to 
redress historical imbalances. The case studies also demonstrated how the original 
concentration of the sugar and timber industries in Southern Africa were located in 
limited areas that provided the necessary natural resources. The government of the 
time, international donor bodies and prevailing multinationals then "kick-started"  56
these industries by providing major inputs, infrastructure and policy to protect these 
fledgling industries until they were able to compete. The original establishment of 
these industries, combined with a lack of incremental natural resources, presents an 
almost insurmountable barrier of entry for new entrants. These industries, moreover, 
display  high levels of site, asset and human skills specificity as a result of the historic 
concentrations of economic development in specific regions of Southern Africa, as 
well as, the evolution of human skills and knowledge over the long term.  
 
In conclusion,  this report summarises the cost to agribusiness of assisting 
smallholders overcome the barriers of entry to high value cash crop sectors. The 
results of the case studies can be used by agribusiness with respect to acquiring a 
better understanding of the process and sacrifices involved. Smallholder contracting 
projects often involve many years of agribusiness inputs before supply commences. In 
many instances, moreover, the company is drawn into protracted equity issues 
involving a local community. The study, in particular, identifies some of the pitfalls 
and hidden costs that agribusiness can incur when embarking on small-scale 
contracting projects. The timber case study, in particular, is indicative of the 
difficulties of managing large numbers of micro farmers that appear to be unable to be 
consolidated as an economic entity. The withdrawal of the financed management 
structure of the agribusiness, in this instance, would result in the collapse of the 
project and the question needs to be asked, whether or not, the micro farmers have 
really overcome the barriers of entry, on a permanent basis, to this industry. 
Contracting projects, ideally, should result in the establishment of permanent growers 
that operate as viable business entities. Whilst support in the s tart-up phase is a 
necessary pre-requisite to overcoming the barriers of entry, the contracted farmers 
need to be weaned out of the company structure on a long-term basis.  
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